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Abstract
This paper investigates the e↵ects of a global uncertainty shock in open
economies and the role of country relative risk exposure in the transmission
of the shock. We employ an Interacted VAR model to take the time-
varying dimension of country relative risk exposure into account. Evidence
of nonlinearities in the real e↵ects of a global uncertainty shock is found.
The reduction in real activity is larger when the country is more exposed to
aggregate risk. These findings support recent theoretical contributions on
the role of risk exposure in the transmission of uncertainty shocks.
Keywords: Global uncertainty shocks, Country relative riskiness, Inter-
national analysis, Interacted VAR, Generalized Impulse Response Functions.
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1 Introduction
In recent years the role of uncertainty in driving business cycle fluctuations received
a great deal of attention in policy debate (e.g., FOMC, 2008; Blanchard, 2009) and,
since the seminal work of Bloom (2009), macroeconomic research has increasingly
focused on the investigation of the mechanisms linking uncertainty to economic
activity, as well as tried to empirically estimate its e↵ects on the economy. It
has been claimed that the increased level of macroeconomic uncertainty was one
of the main causes of the Great Recession of 2008-2009 (e.g., Stock & Watson,
2012) and that heightened uncertainty also played an important role in the slow
recovery that followed thereafter (e.g., Leduc & Liu, 2015). Moreover, Bloom et al.
(2012) among others highlight the fact that uncertainty can also a↵ect economic
policy e↵ectiveness. Indeed, in times of high uncertainty, agents may be cautious
in responding to any stimulus, which can make policy interventions less e↵ective.
As a result, investigating which are the e↵ects of uncertainty on economic activity
became a central issue among policymakers, who are interested in understanding
how to respond to the consequences of heightened uncertainty on the one hand,
and whether policy interventions can reduce uncertainty itself on the other hand.
This paper empirically investigates the e↵ects of global uncertainty shocks in
open economies, by taking into account the role that di↵erent levels of country risk
exposure might have in the transmission of the shock. We address the following
questions: (i) which are the e↵ects of a global uncertainty shock in an open economy
and (ii) does countries’ relative risk exposure play a role in the transmission the
shock? To answer these questions, we perform a Structural Vector Autoregression
(SVAR) analysis on a group of developed countries and take the U.S. as the
benchmark to define our measure of relative riskiness.
More in details, we estimate an Interacted VAR (I-VAR) model and examine
the dynamic responses of output and exchange rate to a global uncertainty shock.
The I-VAR model allows to account for time variation in country relative riskiness
and for the possible presence of nonlinearities in the transmission mechanism of
global uncertainty shocks, through the computation of state conditional impulse
response functions, where the state of the economy is defined by the level of risk
exposure. This cannot be done in a linear framework, like a linear SVAR, since
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in that case the computed impulse response functions only capture the average
response of the endogenous variables to the shock, without accounting for the
possible presence of di↵erent regimes. An Interacted VAR model is a standard
VAR augmented with an interaction term, which includes the variable that we want
to shock and a conditioning variable that identifies the two states of the economy,
that we think can be relevant for the transmission of the shock. This allows to
get responses to the shock of interest conditionally on each of the two regimes
we are interested in, and to account for the possible presence of nonlinear e↵ects.
Particularly, global uncertainty is the variable whose shocks we want to identify,
whereas our conditioning variable is a measure of relative risk exposure.
As a measure of global uncertainty, we take the realized volatility of the MSCI
World Index log returns, where the MSCI World Index is a stock market index that
includes a collection of stocks of developed market countries. We employ interest
rates to discriminate across countries’ heterogeneous risk exposure in our empirical
analysis. Taking the U.S. as the reference country, we consider the spread between
each country’s interbank rate and the Federal Funds rate (FFR) as our measure of
relative riskiness. Following Gourio, Siemer, and Verdelhan (2013)’s two-country
RBC model, we define a country as being in high risk regime when its interbank
rate is lower than the FFR (negative spread), whereas we define the country in
low risk regime when its interbank rate is higher than the FFR (positive spread).
The spread reflects di↵erent levels of precautionary savings in the two countries.
Indeed, the country which is more exposed to aggregate risk experiences a higher
level of precautionary savings, which implies a higher demand for safe assets and
hence a lower (risk-free) rate. On the other hand, a lower exposure to risk implies
a lower level of precautionary savings for the country, and hence a higher interest
rate, since the demand for risk-free assets would be lower.
An important feature of the specification of our I-VAR is that both variables in
the interaction term are endogenously modeled, which implies that interest rate
spreads are likely to react to a global uncertainty shock. This means that the
economy can endogenously switch from one regime to the other within each horizon.
Therefore, following Pellegrino (2014) and Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino
(2015), dynamic responses of the endogenous variables to the uncertainty shock are
computed as Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) a` la Koop, Pesaran,
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and Potter (1996). Indeed, through GIRFs the nonlinearity of the system is fully
taken into account, because the responses of the endogenous variables will depend
on the size and the sign of the shock, as well as on the initial conditions of the
system and the future shocks.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, concerning question (i) on
the e↵ects of global uncertainty shocks in open economies, the dynamic responses
of our variables of interest show that output negatively responds to the shock and
exchange rate appreciates. The sign of the response of output is consistent with the
main findings in the literature on uncertainty. Then, relative to question (ii) about
the role of relative risk exposure in the transmission of the shock, we find that
the level of countries’ relative exposure to aggregate risk plays a relevant role in
the transmission of a global uncertainty shock. Indeed, a global uncertainty shock
generates a significant reduction in real activity when the economy is in high risk
regime, whereas in low risk regime the response is generally not statistically di↵erent
from zero. Moreover, the di↵erences between the dynamic responses of output in
the two regimes are statistically significant, meaning that the responses of output
in high risk are estimated to be statistically larger than those in low risk. This
results provide evidence for the presence of nonlinear e↵ects in the transmission of
global uncertainty shocks to economic activity. Further support to this evidence is
provided by the results of an exercise in which we explore what happens when the
two riskiness regimes become “extreme”, i.e. when the distance in country relative
risk exposure widens (meaning that interest rate spread increases in absolute value).
Our main result is that, as the distance in countries’ relative risk exposure increases,
also the di↵erence between the estimated responses in the two regimes increases.
These findings support the theoretical model proposed by Gourio et al. (2013),
where an increase in aggregate risk produces a larger decline in economic activity
in the country which is more exposed to aggregate risk. Concerning exchange rate,
we find that it appreciates on impact in response to a global uncertainty shock
in both riskiness regimes, but we find little evidence in favor of the presence of
nonlinearities in the transmission of the shock to the exchange rate, evidence which
mainly comes from our exercise with “extreme” riskiness regimes.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on uncertainty in several
respects. We propose a multi-country analysis on the e↵ects of global uncertainty
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shocks in open economies and investigate the role of countries’ relative risk exposure
in the transmission of the shock. As a measure of global uncertainty we propose
the quarterly series of realized volatilities of the returns of the MSCI World
Index.1 Relative to Carrie`re-Swallow and Ce´spedes (2013), who also consider an
open economy framework, we consider both the responses of economic activity
and exchange rate to the shock.2 To examine how di↵erent levels of country
risk exposure a↵ect the transmission of a global uncertainty shock, we employ a
nonlinear model, specifically an Interacted VAR model, which allows to account
for the presence of two di↵erent riskiness regimes in the economy and to compute
state-conditional responses to the global uncertainty shock.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 discusses the relation to
the literature. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and the data employed
in the analysis. Section 4 describes the nonlinear model. Section 5 illustrates the
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper mainly relates to macroeconomic research which investigates the role of
uncertainty in driving business cycle fluctuations. A non-exclusive list of recent
works includes Bloom (2009); Bloom et al. (2012); Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron-
Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe (2011); Benigno et al. (2012). Bloom (2014)
provides a survey of the main facts, issues and contributions related to uncertainty.
A widely recognized result is that uncertainty shocks negatively a↵ect economic
activity by producing a fall in the levels of production and employment.
Theoretical contributions have emphasized two transmission channels for uncer-
1Related contributions investigating the e↵ects of global uncertainty on economic activity, as
Carrie`re-Swallow and Ce´spedes (2013) and Cesa-Bianchi, Pesaran, and Rebucci (2014) propose
di↵erent measures. Carrie`re-Swallow and Ce´spedes measure global uncertainty shocks as strong
increases in the VIX index, whereas Cesa-Bianchi et al. construct a quarterly measure of global
uncertainty by using daily returns across 109 asset prices worldwide.
2Benigno, Benigno, and Nistico` (2012) investigate the relationship between uncertainty and
the exchange rate employing an open economy VAR and examine the response of the exchange
rate to changes in the volatility of nominal and real shocks. The measures of uncertainty they use
are given by the time-varying volatilities of a monetary policy shock, an inflation-target shock
and a productivity shock.
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tainty to a↵ect economic activity in closed economies. The first one relates to the
idea of real options, for which high levels of uncertainty increase the option value of
postponing investment decisions and hiring for firms, and durable consumption for
households, particularly when the cost of reversing decisions is high. Then, a high
level of uncertainty reduces the levels of investment, hiring and consumption, thus
reducing economic activity (e.g., Bernanke, 1983; Bloom, 2009). The other channel
examined in the literature focuses on risk aversion and risk premia. Arellano,
Bai, and Kehoe (2012) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) among others
emphasize how a higher level of uncertainty leads investors to ask for increasing
risk premia to be compensated for higher risk. Higher uncertainty also increases
the probability of default. As a consequence, uncertainty raises borrowing costs,
which can reduce growth. Ilut and Schneider (2011) explore the confidence e↵ect
of uncertainty in models where agents have pessimistic beliefs and act as if the
worst outcomes will occur, showing a behaviour known as “ambiguity aversion”.
Increasing uncertainty expands the range of possible outcomes, and makes the worst
outcome worse, which can induce agents to reduce hiring and investment. In a third
mechanism that relates to risk aversion, a rise in uncertainty can induce consumers
to increase the level of precautionary savings, thus reducing consumption and
economic activity in the short-run (Bansal & Yaron, 2004; Fernandez-Villaverde,
Guerron-Quintana, Kuester, & Rubio-Ramirez, 2011; Leduc & Liu, 2015; Basu &
Bundick, 2015).
Concerning open economies, recently Gourio et al. (2013) have proposed a
two-country real business cycle model, to understand the e↵ects of changes in
aggregate risk on economic activity in small open economies, in the presence of
heterogeneous country risk exposure. Aggregate risk, which Gourio et al. interpret
as a global uncertainty shock, and heterogeneity in country risk exposure are the
two key elements of this model.3 Concerned with the e↵ects of uncertainty shocks in
open economies are also Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez,
3The key mechanism of the model is the following. Following an increase in the probability of
an economic disaster, investment falls because of a reduction in capital holdings by firms, due to
increasing risk premia. At the same time, output and employment reduce. Hence, an increase
in disaster probability leads to a recession. The risk-free interest rate falls as the demand for
safe assets rises (flight to quality e↵ect) and equity prices drop. All these e↵ects are stronger in
the more risky country. Concerning the exchange rate, the currency of the most risky country
appreciates in response to an increase in disaster probability.
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and Uribe (2011), Benigno et al. (2012) and Carrie`re-Swallow and Ce´spedes (2013).
Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe focus on the
role played by changes in the volatility of the real exchange rate in the dynamics
of business cycle fluctuations of emerging economies. Benigno et al. analyze the
response of the exchange rate to shocks to the volatilities of a monetary policy shock,
a shock to the inflation target and a productivity shock, in an open economy VAR
framework.4 Carrie`re-Swallow and Ce´spedes estimate the response of investment
and private consumption to a global uncertainty shock in 40 countries in an open
economy VAR. Global uncertainty shocks are measured as strong increases in the
VIX index. Investigating the e↵ects of global uncertainty shocks on economic
activity is also the aim of Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2014), who estimate a Global VAR
for 33 countries. A quarterly series for uncertainty is constructed using the realized
volatilities of 109 asset prices worldwide.
Other empirical contributions on the e↵ects of uncertainty shocks on economic
activity employ country-specific measures of uncertainty, especially those captur-
ing uncertainty in the U.S.. Moreover, most of them are single-country studies
investigating the e↵ects of country-specific uncertainty shocks, and in some cases
exploring the presence of spillover e↵ects in other countries (e.g., Colombo, 2013).
From a methodological perspective, most contributions employ linear models for
the analysis and particularly linear Structural VARs (e.g., Bloom, 2009; Alex-
opoulos & Cohen, 2009; Mumtaz & Theodoridis, 2012; Baker, Bloom, & Davis,
2013). Nevertheless, more recent works also take into account the possibility for
the state of the economy to have a role in the transmission of uncertainty shocks
and investigate the issue through nonlinear models, that allow for regime switches.
Among them, Enders and Jones (2013) employ a Smooth Transition autoregres-
sive model to explore the presence of asymmetric e↵ects of uncertainty shocks on
a number of macroeconomic variables. Bijsterbosch and Gue´rin (2013) propose a
two-step procedure in which they identify episodes of high uncertainty in the U.S.,
4They find that the exchange rate appreciates in response to an increase in the volatility of
the monetary and the inflation target shocks, and that it depreciates following an increase in the
volatility of the productivity shock. They also develop a two-country open economy model in
which the channel that links uncertainty and exchange rate is a hedging motive. The currency
does not necessarily depreciates following an uncertainty shock. If the currency is relatively safer
when the shock occurs, then heightened uncertainty may improve its hedging properties, leading
to an appreciation.
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through a Markov switching approach, and then regress several macroeconomic
and financial variables on this high uncertainty indicator. Caggiano, Castelnuovo,
and Groshenny (2014) employ a Smooth Transition VAR to estimate the response
of unemployment to uncertainty shocks during recessions. Caggiano, Castelnuovo,
and Nodari (2015) employ the same methodology to explore the asymmetric e↵ects
of uncertainty shocks over the business cycle and to analyze the e↵ectiveness of the
systematic part of monetary policy in dealing with the real e↵ects of uncertainty
shocks. Alessandri and Mumtaz (2014) investigate the role of financial markets con-
ditions in the transmission of uncertainty shocks. Ricco, Callegari, and Cimadomo
(2014) analyze the e↵ects of fiscal policy shocks in the presence of fiscal policy
uncertainty. Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino (2015) employ an Interacted
VAR to investigate whether the e↵ects of uncertainty shocks on economic activity
are greater when the economy is at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB).
3 Empirical strategy
This paper aims at answering two questions: (i) which are the e↵ects of a global
uncertainty shock in open economies and (ii) does countries’ relative risk exposure
play a role in the transmission the shock? To answer these questions, the empirical
analysis is organized as follows. First, as a warm-up exercise, we explore the e↵ects
of global uncertainty in open economies, through the estimation of a linear VAR
model for a group of eleven countries. To investigate whether countries’ relative
risk exposure does play a relevant role in the transmission of the shock, we employ a
nonlinear specification and estimate an Interacted VAR model. Indeed, a nonlinear
model such as an I-VAR allows to compute state-dependent impulse responses,
i.e. responses of output and exchange rate conditional on the riskiness level of the
economy. With respect to the sample of countries considered for the linear exercise,
we perform the nonlinear analysis on a subsample of countries, where the selection
criterion is given by the results of a linearity test. The nonlinear analysis will be
limited to those countries for which the linearity test provides evidence in favour of
the nonlinear specification, by rejecting the null hypothesis of a linear specification.
Indeed, a nonlinear model would be misspecified if the true data generating process
is linear.
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3.1 Data
For our investigation we consider a group of eleven countries: Australia, Austria,
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and United
Kingdom, which can all be considered as small open economies with respect to the
U.S.. We employ quarterly data. The starting time for estimation changes across
countries, depending on data availability,5 whereas for all of them the estimation
period ends in 2008Q2. The period starting in 2008Q3 and including the financial
crisis and the subsequent Great Recession is excluded from the analysis. The reason
for this choice is that, since the end of 2008, policy rate hit the zero lower bound
(ZLB) in the U.S., as well as in most advanced economies thereafter, and as a
consequence, interest rate spreads which captures countries’ relative risk exposure
in our analysis, stayed almost constant and very close to zero during the subsequent
period. This might significantly a↵ect the results of our analysis.6
Six variables are included in the specification. A measure of global uncertainty
(V OL) is obtained as the 90-day realized volatility of the MSCI World Index log
returns, computed as the standard deviations of daily returns over calendar quarters.
The MSCI World Index (MSCI) is a stock market index that includes a collection
of stocks of developed market countries. Since open economies are considered, we
also include the spot bilateral nominal exchange rate of country i with respect to
U.S. dollar (USD) (S$/i), measured as units of USD for one unit of foreign currency.
Hence an increase in S$/i means an appreciation of the currency of country i and a
USD depreciation. We then include a consumer price index (CPIi) as a measure
of prices and gross domestic product (GDPi) as a measure of economic activity.
SPREADi is the di↵erence between country i overnight interbank rate and the
Federal Funds rate, and it is the variable that captures countries’ relative riskiness
with respect to the U.S.. Macroeconomic data are taken from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis FRED database, whereas we refer to Bloomberg for financial
data.7
5Australia 1973Q1, Austria 1988Q1, Canada 1973Q1, Finland 1990Q1, France 1973Q1, Ger-
many 1973Q1, Italy 1981Q1, Netherlands 1988Q1, Norway 1979Q1, Sweden 1973Q1, UK 1973Q1.
6The transmission of uncertainty shocks in the presence of the ZLB is explored in Caggiano,
Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino (2015).
7We use GDP Implicit Price Deflator, Index 2010=100, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
(all countries but Sweden); Consumer Price Index All Items, Index 2010=100, Quarterly, Not
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The model is estimated via OLS for each of the countries in our sample. We
consider the U.S. as the reference country when defining relative riskiness. For
this reason the U.S. enter the specification through the exchange rate, which is
measured as units of USD for one unit of foreign currency, and interest rate spread,
which is computed as the di↵erence between each country’s interbank rate and
the FFR. All variables are taken in log-levels, with the exception of volatility and
interest rate spreads, which are in levels. Equation-specific constants are included
in both the linear and nonlinear specifications and the number of lags is selected
via the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).8
To identify the global uncertainty shock from the vector of reduced form residuals
we employ short-run restrictions (Cholesky decomposition), with the endogenous
variables ordered as follows: (i) stock market index, (ii) volatility, (iii) exchange rate,
(iv) prices, (v) consumption, (vi) production, (vii) interest rate spread. Following
Bloom (2009) we order the stock market index before volatility, in order to control
for the impact of stock market levels and to focus on a volatility shock which is
orthogonal to market levels. Results obtained from an identification scheme with
uncertainty ordered last will be illustrated in the section of robustness checks.
Measuring uncertainty. Concerning our proxy for global uncertainty, measures
of implied volatility like the VIX index are usually preferred as proxies for uncer-
tainty in the literature, because they are forward-looking variables and capture
market expectations. Nevertheless, realized volatilities of stock market returns
are considered as a good approximation and are largely used when measures of
implied volatility are not available (e.g., Bloom, 2009), in that they generally show
Seasonally Adjusted (Sweden); Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure in Constant Prices: Total
Gross Domestic Product, Index 2010=1, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted; Gross Domestic Product
by Expenditure in Constant Prices: Private Final Consumption Expenditure, Index 2010=1,
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted; US Dollar to National Currency Spot Exchange Rate, US Dollar
per National Currency Units, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted; Immediate Rates: Less than
24 Hours: London Clearing Banks Rate, Percent, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted (UK);
Immediate Rates: Less than 24 Hours: Central Bank Rates, Percent, Quarterly, Not Seasonally
Adjusted (Austria, Finland); Immediate Rates: Less than 24 Hours: Call Money/Interbank Rate,
Percent, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted (France, Germany, Sweden); 3-Month or 90-Day
Rates and Yields: Interbank Rates, Percent, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted; E↵ective Federal
Funds Rate, Percent, Monthly, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
8For some countries we also include a deterministic trend: Austria, Finland, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden for the linear VAR specification; Norway and Sweden for the I-VAR.
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a high degree of correlation with measures of implied volatility. Also in our case
correlation between the realized volatility of the MSCI index returns and the VIX
is equal to 0.83. Moreover, in Gourio et al. (2013) a change in disaster probability
is proxied by a change in equity market volatility, when they empirically test the
key mechanism of their model. Indeed they find that there is a high degree of
correlation between equity implied volatility and the risk of large drops in equity
prices in the United States, which is consistent with their model. Hence they
interpret shocks to equity realized volatility as shocks to disaster probability, thus
linking their work to the literature on uncertainty. Figure 1 plots the quarterly
time series of our measure of global uncertainty. The series displays large spikes
at all major economic and political shocks in the recent history at a worldwide
level, like the OPEC oil-price shocks in 1973 and 1978, the two Gulf wars in 1990
and 2003, the Asian crisis in 1997 and the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001, when
uncertainty appears to largely increase.9
3.2 A linear SVAR exercise
As a warm-up exercise to assess the responses of output and exchange rate to a
global uncertainty shock, we estimate a linear SVAR model for each of the countries
in our sample. A common SVAR representation is the following:
A0yt =
kX
`=1
A`yt ` + ut
where yt = [MSCI V OL S$/i CPIi GDPi SPREADi]0 is the vector of endoge-
nous variables, A0 is the matrix that captures the contemporaneous relations
among the variables, A` is the q ⇥ q matrix of autoregressive coe cients up to lag
k and ut is the vector of structural shocks.
Figures 3 and 4 plot impulse responses of exchange rate and GDP to a one-
9The spikes are identified following the procedure in Bloom (2009). We take the HP detrended
(  = 129, 600) series of the 30-day realized volatility of the MSCI World Index log returns,
computed as the standard deviations of daily returns over calendar months, and assign a value
of one to the observations that correspond to a value of shock-market volatility more than 1.65
standard deviations above the HP detrended mean. Among the events selected by this procedure,
we only keep those that we define as global shocks.
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standard deviation global uncertainty shock, along with 68% confidence bands,
for each of the countries in our sample. Some regularities across countries can
be noticed in the responses of both variables. Concerning the exchange rate, it
responds to the shock by significantly appreciating on impact in all countries
but Australia, Austria and Canada (fig. 3). The response of GDP is often not
statistically di↵erent from zero on impact, but then turns significantly negative
some quarters after the shock in the cases of Australia, Canada, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and UK (fig. 4). Austria and Netherlands are
the only two exceptions, and display a significant positive response. As a general
conclusion for this linear part of the analysis, we have that in most countries
exchange rate appreciates on impact and output reduces in response to a global
uncertainty shock. This last finding is in line with the main results in the literature
on uncertainty.
We now move to the core part of our empirical analysis, where we employ an
Interacted VAR to evaluate whether the level of countries’ risk exposure plays a
relevant role in the transmission of a global uncertainty shock. Indeed, impulse
responses computed from the linear model just allow to evaluate average responses
of the endogenous variables to the shock, whereas we want to account for time
variation in countries’ relative riskiness and consider the possible presence of
di↵erent states of the economy in our empirical specification.
4 Relative riskiness and Interacted VARs
4.1 Measuring countries’ relative risk exposure
First, to investigate whether countries’ relative exposure to risk does have a role
in the transmission of global uncertainty shocks, a measure of relative riskiness is
needed. Following Gourio et al. (2013), we employ interest rates to discriminate
across countries’ heterogeneous risk exposure in the empirical analysis that follows.
Taking the U.S. as our reference country, we consider the spread between each
country’s interbank rate and the Federal Funds rate (FFR) as our measure of
relative risk exposure. Indeed, movements in interest rate spreads are generally
12
thought to deliver important signals about the evolution of economic activity,
a view that is supported by a large literature on the predictive content of yield
spreads. The idea is that fluctuations in spreads may reflect the quality of borrowers’
balance sheets, on which their access to external finance depends, as well as shifts
in the availability of funds provided by financial intermediaries. In both cases,
movements in interest rate spreads may signal an increase in the cost of credit
and/or a reduction in the supply of credit, which can cause a reduction in spending
and production (see Gilchrist & Zakrajsek, 2012).
More in details, for each country in our sample, when the interbank-FFR spread
is positive, then the interbank rate is higher than the FFR and we define the country
as less risky than the U.S., whereas when the spread is negative, the interbank rate
is lower than the FFR and the country is defined as more risky than the U.S..
The way in which the two riskiness regimes are identified refers once again to
one of the results in Gourio et al.’model. Indeed, as a result of model calibration,
the high interest rate country has the lower exposure to disaster risk, whereas the
low interest rate country is the more exposed to aggregate risk. The explanation
for this result refers to di↵erent levels of precautionary savings in the two countries.
A higher exposure to disaster risk would imply a higher level of precautionary
savings, which means a higher demand for safe assets and hence a lower (risk-free)
interest rate. On the other hand, a lower exposure to disaster risk would imply
a lower level of precautionary savings and hence a higher interest rate, since the
demand for risk-free assets would be lower. According to this view, the interbank
rate spreads that we use as a measure of relative riskiness would reflect the relative
availability of risk-free assets in the two countries, which in turn depends on the
level of precautionary savings, being the level of precautionary savings related to
the perceived economic strength of the country, i.e. on the level of exposure to
economic risk.10
Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of interest rate spreads for each of
10Rates on Treasury bills are generally used as a proxy for the risk-free rate. For the present
analysis, we employ interbank rate spreads rather than sovereign spreads, because longer series
are available. However, interbank and sovereign spreads display a high degree of correlation. For
the same reason, we use the FFR, for which a longer series is available, rather than interbank
rates for the U.S.. Also in this case, the degree of correlation between FFR and U.S. interbank
rates is very high, almost equal to one.
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the countries in our sample. Time variation is an important dimension of this
cross-country relationship, and it clearly emerges from the plots. Heterogeneity
can be noticed across two dimensions. On the one hand, each country oscillates
between low and high risk, displaying both positive and negative spreads over time
(being zero the threshold that separates the two riskiness regimes according to our
definition). On the other hand, the plots also show a high degree of variability in
risk exposure across countries.
4.2 Interacted VARs
To evaluate the role of risk exposure in the transmission of global uncertainty
shocks, we employ a nonlinear approach, and particularly consider an Interacted
VAR model, following Pellegrino (2014) and Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino
(2015). An I-VAR is a standard VAR augmented with an interaction term, which
includes the variable that we want to shock and the conditioning variable that
identifies the two regimes we are interested in. This allows us to get responses to
our shock of interest conditionally on the state of the economy which we think can
be relevant for the transmission of the shock. In this framework, we can define two
regimes for each country, a high risk regime and a low risk one relative to the U.S.,
depending on whether the interest rate spread is below or above zero, and compute
state-dependent impulse response functions, in order to evaluate whether di↵erent
levels of relative risk exposure do have an influence on the transmission of a global
uncertainty shock.
Interacted VAR models have been recently introduced in macroeconomic studies.
A panel I-VAR has been proposed by Towbin and Weber (2011) to analyze how the
transmission of external shocks in open economies is influenced by the exchange rate
regime, the level of foreign currency debt and by the import structure. Sa´, Towbin,
and Wieladek (2014) also use a panel I-VAR to explore how the mortgage-market
characteristics influence the way in which shocks to capital inflows impact the
housing market in a group of OECD countries. Lanau and Wieladek (2012) employ
the same methodology to examine the relationship between financial regulation
and the current account, whereas Nickel and Tudyka (2013) investigate the impact
of fiscal policy at di↵erent levels of government debt. Aastveit, Natvik, and Sola
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(2013) employ an I-VAR to investigate the e↵ectiveness of monetary policy shocks
in low and high uncertainty regimes. A similar issue is analyzed in Pellegrino
(2014), who adds an important novelty in that the variables entering the interaction
term are fully endogenous in the model, whereas they were treated as exogenous in
previous works. This requires to compute Generalized Impulse Response functions
(GIRFs) a` la Koop et al. (1996) to take the time-varying behaviour of the system
into account. Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino (2015) employ the same
methodology as Pellegrino (2014) to address the issue of the impact of uncertainty
shocks at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB). In this paper we follow Pellegrino (2014)
and Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino (2015) by making the interaction term
with which we augment our VAR fully endogenous and then by computing GIRFs
to recover the state-dependent responses.
In this context, the use of an I-VAR model has several advantages with respect
to alternative nonlinear specifications, such as Smooth-Transition VARs, Time-
Varying-Parameters VARs, Nonlinear Local Projections and Threshold VARs.
STVARs are computationally more intensive than I-VARs and require calibrating
the slope parameter in the transition function, which regulates the smoothness of
the transition between regimes and a↵ects the probability of being in one regime
or the other. Such a calibration is not needed for estimating an I-VAR. Also
TVP-VARs are computationally more demanding than I-VARs, and moreover
require setting priors for estimation. Nonlinear Local Projections instead do not
allow to endogenously model the conditioning variable and hence do not allow for
endogenous switches from one regime to another, which is an essential feature in
our specification, where both variables in the interaction term are endogenously
modeled. T-VARs could o↵er an interesting alternative to I-VARs in this setting,
since a T–VAR model is not computationally intensive and allows to model sudden
regime changes like the ones we are considering. Moreover, in a T-VAR the
threshold that defines the two states of the economy can be endogenously estimated.
Nevertheless, a T-VAR does not allow for endogenous regime switches, whereas
an I-VAR model does, and only allows for the computation of conditionally linear
impulse response functions, rather than GIRFs.
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Our I-VAR model has the following representation:
yt = µ+
kX
`=1
A`yt ` +
kX
`=1
c`(V OLt ` ⇥ IRt `) + ut
where yt is the q⇥1 vector of explanatory variables, µ is the q⇥1 vector of intercepts,
A` is the q⇥ q matrix of autoregressive coe cients up to lag k and ut ⇠ N (0,⌃) is
the q⇥1 vector of residuals, whose covariance matrix is ⌃. (V OLt `⇥IRt `) is the
interaction term, which includes our measure of global uncertainty (V OL) and the
di↵erence between the interbank rate of each country and the FFR (SPREAD), as
our measure of country relative riskiness. Indeed, global uncertainty is the variable
whose shocks we want to identify, whereas interest rate spread is the conditioning
variable that defines the two states of low and high risk. c` is the q ⇥ 1 vector
of coe cients. The same number of lags is imposed for the linear part and the
interaction term.
Evidence in favour of nonlinear specification. Since a nonlinear model
would be misspecified if the true data generating process is linear, we perform a
linearity test to provide evidence in favour of the nonlinear specification. For this
reason, the nonlinear part of the analysis will be performed only for those countries
for which the test provides such an evidence. Since the linear VAR and the I-VAR
are nested models, it is possible to use a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis
of a linear specification against the alternative of an I-VAR model. We employ the
following test statistic:
LR = T
 
ln | ⌃˜ru |  ln | ⌃˜u |
 
where T is the sample size; | ⌃˜ru | is the determinant of the estimated variance
covariance matrix of the residuals in the linear VAR (restricted model), whereas
| ⌃˜u | is the estimated variance covariance matrix of the residuals in the I-VAR
specification (unrestricted model); ln is the natural logarithm operator. The
optimal number of lags is selected for the linear model through the AIC and is
then imposed also to the nonlinear specification.
Under the null hypothesis of linearity, the test statistic has an asymptotic Chi-
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squared distribution, the number of degrees of freedom being the di↵erence between
the number of coe cients estimated under the alternative and the number of
coe cients estimated under the null hypothesis, that is the number of restrictions
between the two specifications.11 Table 1 shows the results of the test. The
null hypothesis of a linear VAR model is rejected for six out of eleven countries:
Australia, Germany, Netherlands and Norway (at 5% significance level), Canada
(1% significance level) and Sweden (10% significance level). Therefore, the nonlinear
part of the analysis will only consider these countries. The null hypothesis of a
linear specification cannot be rejected for Austria, Finland, France, Italy and the
United Kingdom.
Table 1: LR-test results
Country LR p-value
Australia 16.2197 0.0126
Austria 9.8241 0.1323
Canada 20.1593 0.0026
Finland 9.2098 0.1621
France 3.2595 0.7756
Germany 15.4709 0.0169
Italy 5.2204 0.5159
Netherlands 13.2060 0.0399
Norway 13.2547 0.0392
Sweden 11.8363 0.0657
UK 6.8959 0.3306
Notes: In red are the results which are not
statistically significant.
11Since the same number of lags is imposed for the linear part and the interaction term, and
since the two models are estimated with the same number of lags, the number of restrictions is
given by the product between the number of endogenous variables and the selected number of
lags.
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4.3 Generalized Impulse Response Functions
Most I-VARs used in the literature employ interaction terms which include variables
that are not endogenously modeled. This implies that the dynamic responses of the
endogenous variables to a shock in a given state are conditionally linear for a given
value of the interaction variables. An important feature of the specification of our
I-VAR is that both variables in the interaction term are endogenously modeled.
This implies that interest rate spreads are likely to react to a global uncertainty
shock, meaning that the economy can endogenously switch from one regime to the
other within each horizon, as pointed out in Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino
(2015).
Hence, following Pellegrino (2014) and Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino
(2015), the dynamic responses of the endogenous variables to a global uncertainty
shock are computed as Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) a` la Koop
et al. (1996), but working with orthogonalized shocks as in Kilian and Vigfusson
(2011), so that we can talk of a global uncertainty shock. Through GIRFs we can
fully take the nonlinearity of the system into account, since the dynamic responses
of the endogenous variables will depend on the size and the sign of the shock as
well as on the initial conditions of the system. Following Koop et al. (1996), the
GIRFy(h,  ,!t 1) of the vector of endogenous variables yt, h periods ahead, for a
given initial condition !t 1 = {yt 1, . . . ,yt k}, k being the number of lags in the
I-VAR, and a structural shock hitting at time t,  , can be expressed as follows:
GIRFy(h,  ,!t 1) = E[yt+h |  ,!t 1]  E[yt+h |!t 1]
where E[·] is the expectation operator and h = 0, 1, . . . , H indicates the horizons
for which the GIRF is computed.12
12Details on the algorithm used to compute state-conditional GIRFS are provided in the
Appendix.
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5 Results
5.1 Nonlinear model: Baseline specification
Figures 5 and 7 plot the impulse responses of exchange rate and GDP to a one-
standard deviation global uncertainty shock, computed from the estimation of the
I-VAR model, along with 68% confidence bands, for high (red line) an low risk (blue
line) regimes, for each of the countries in our sample. Figures 6 and 8 document
the di↵erences between the point estimates of the impulse responses computed in
the two states, which are obtained by subtracting the response under low risk state
from the response under high risk state. 68% confidence bands resulting from the
empirical distribution of such di↵erences are plotted.
Concerning the exchange rate (fig. 5), it significantly appreciates on impact
in response to the shock in both states of the economy, for all countries except
for Australia and Canada. For these two countries, responses are not statistically
significant in neither of riskiness regime, except for low risk regime in Canada,
where exchange rate significantly appreciates some quarters after the shock. For
all countries whose currencies display a significant response to the shock, response
in low risk state seems to be larger than that in high risk state, but the di↵erences
in point estimates (fig. 6) show that this di↵erence is only marginally statistically
significant. Moreover, the pattern followed by the two responses is very similar.
Hence, we do not find significant evidence of nonlinearities driven by relative
riskiness in the transmission of global uncertainty shocks to exchange rates.
For what concerns real activity (fig. 7), a global uncertainty shock generates a
significant reduction in output when the country is in high risk state, in the cases
of Germany, Norway and Sweden. The response of Australia is only marginally
statistically di↵erent from zero. In low risk state, the responses of GDP are generally
not statistically di↵erent from zero. Di↵erences in the point estimates of responses
in the two states confirm that the response in high risk state is significantly larger
than that in low risk state, for all countries for which the response in high risk
state is significantly negative (Germany, Norway and Sweden, fig. 8). Hence,
state-conditional impulse responses of GDP obtained from the estimation of our
nonlinear specification provide evidence in favour of the presence of nonlinearities
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in the transmission of global uncertainty shocks. Particularly, the level of relative
risk exposure, as captured by short-term interest rate spreads, seems to play a
significant role in the transmission of global uncertainty shocks to economic activity.
The results obtained for real activity also support the predictions of Gourio et al.
(2013)’s model, about the e↵ects of changes in aggregate risk on the economy in the
presence of heterogeneous country risk exposure. Indeed, according to their model,
the same increase in disaster probability has more negative e↵ects on economic
activity in the country which is more exposed to aggregate risk, by producing
a larger reduction in investment and output. The estimated impulse response
functions for some of the countries in our sample point in the same direction, since
the response of output is estimated to be significantly more negative when the
country is more exposed to risk. On the other hand, Gourio et al.’s model predicts
that the currency of the more risky country appreciates in response to an increase
in disaster probability, whereas our results do not display statistical di↵erence
between the responses in the two regimes.13 Hence, our findings do not provide
supporting evidence to these predictions, because currencies appreciate in response
to a global uncertainty shock in both riskiness states, and the two responses are
estimated to be statistically the same.
These results are confirmed by the patterns that emerge in figures 9 and 10,
which report the dynamic responses of exchange rate and output respectively, for
each initial condition within each regime. Dynamic responses of both exchange rate
and output display a large variability both across and within regimes. However, a
clear distinction between the two regimes can be noticed for the response of output.
This distinction less clearly emerges when we look at the responses of exchange
rate.
13In Gourio et al.’s theoretical framework, the response of the exchange rate is driven by con-
sumption. Indeed, the exchange rate reflects the relative value of current and future consumption
in the two countries, and since the more risky country expects a larger decline in consumption
growth than the less risky one, its marginal utility of consumption rises more and its currency
appreciates.
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5.2 “Very high” and ”very low” risk regimes
So far, we have explored the presence of nonlinear e↵ects and the role of countries’
relative risk exposure in the transmission of global uncertainty shocks in open
economies. Our main finding is that a global uncertainty shock has larger negative
e↵ects on economic activity when the country is relatively more risky. In order to
further investigate the issue, we ask which are the e↵ects of a global uncertainty
shock when the distance in relative risk exposure among countries widens, that
is when the spread between short term interest rates increases in absolute value.
This analysis is performed through the identification of two subsets of initial
conditions, associated with di↵erent levels of the interest rate spread. We define
as “very high”/“very low” risk regime initial conditions in which the value of the
conditioning variable, namely interest rate spread, is below/above two standard
deviations from the mean. Then, for each of these two subsets of initial conditions
we recompute GIRFs.
Figures 11 and 12 show the GIRFs computed for the two extreme regimes and
the di↵erences in the point estimates of responses for both output and exchange
rate, for each country in our sample.14 Relative to our baseline results, the displayed
impulse responses support our main findings for what concerns output, whereas
they provide some evidence in favor of nonlinearities in the transmission of global
uncertainty shocks to the exchange rate. Indeed, as the distance in the level of
relative risk exposure increases, also the distance in the estimated impulse responses
widens, thus reinforcing the idea that relative riskiness plays a relevant role in the
transmission of global uncertainty shocks.
Particularly, concerning the response of the exchange rate (fig. 11), it can be
noticed that the distance between the responses in the two “extreme” regimes is
generally larger than the one observed in our baseline results. Further support is
provided by the di↵erences in the point estimates, which are now larger than the
ones displayed in the baseline case. Moreover, for Canada, Germany and Sweden
responses in the two regimes display di↵erent patterns. For what concerns output
(fig. 12), the response of economic activity becomes more negative and persistent
as the level of riskiness increases, in the cases of Germany, Norway and Sweden,
14Di↵erences in the point estimates are computed as (GIRFvery high risk  GIRFvery low risk).
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consistently with our previous findings. This result is supported once again by the
di↵erences in point estimates, which in the case of Germany are estimated to be
larger than in our baseline case. Some marginal evidence in the same direction
also emerges for Australia, whereas we do not find any evidence in this sense for
Canada.
To summarize the main results for this part of the analysis, it is worth noticing
that estimated responses to a global uncertainty shock of both exchange rate and
output are sensitive to the level of relative riskiness. Indeed, responses are generally
stronger as the regime becomes more “extreme”, i.e. as countries become more
distant in terms of their level of risk exposure. This findings provide supporting
evidence to the main result of our I-VAR analysis, that cross-country di↵erences in
risk exposure are important in explaining the e↵ects of a global uncertainty shock
in open economies.
5.3 Consumption, external sector and financial flows
The results shown so far lead to the conclusion that following a global uncertainty
shock economic activity reduces and the exchange rate appreciates. Moreover,
countries’ relative risk exposure seems to play a relevant role in the transmission of
the shock, with significant nonlinearities arising especially in the e↵ects on output.
The channels through which a global uncertainty shock may a↵ect the dynamics
of exchange rate and economic activity are diverse. Here we examine three of
them, that we think to be especially relevant: consumption, the external sector
and financial flows.
First, in Gourio et al. (2013)’s theoretical model the response of exchange rate
is driven by consumption. Indeed, the exchange rate reflects the relative value of
current and future consumption in the two countries, and because the more risky
country expects a larger decline in consumption growth than the less risky one,
following a global uncertainty shock, then its marginal utility of consumption rises
more and its currency appreciates. For this reason we estimate a specification of
our model where we include consumption as an endogenous variable, ordered before
output. Then, given that we examine an open economy framework, movements in
the external sector may play a relevant role in the transmission of global uncertainty
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shocks. Hence, we estimate an alternative specification in which we include net
exports ordered before output, in the vector of endogenous variables. Finally,
international financial flows may be particularly helpful in explaining the dynamics
of the exchange rate in response to the shock. For instance, heightened global
uncertainty could in principle activate a flight to quality mechanism, with money
leaving high risk countries and flowing towards less risky ones. This would a↵ect
foreign currency availability on currency markets and hence the exchange rate.
Therefore, we propose a third alternative specification of our I-VAR, where a
measure of financial flows is included, ordered after uncertainty and before the
exchange rate.15
Figures 13-30 show the GIRFs obtained from these three alternative estimations
and the di↵erences in the point estimates, along with 68% confidence bands. Figures
13-18 refer to the specification including consumption. Our baseline results are
confirmed for both output and exchange rate. The response of output is significantly
more negative when the country is in high risk, whereas the exchange rate responds
to the shock in a very similar way in both regimes.16 Concerning consumption (fig.
17-18), we find heterogenous responses across countries and across regimes. For
Australia and Canada, the response of consumption is not statistically significant
in either regime. For Germany, Netherlands and Sweden, consumption positively
responds to the shock in low risk, whereas the response is not significant in high
risk. Finally, consumption significantly negatively responds in both regimes in the
case of Norway, and the response in high risk is marginally larger than that in low
risk.
15As a measure of consumption we use Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure in Constant
Prices: Private Final Consumption Expenditure, Index 2010 = 1, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted.
Net exports are computed as the di↵erence between Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure in
Constant Prices: Export of Goods and Services, Index 2010 = 1, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
and Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure in Constant Prices: Less: Imports of Goods and
Services, Index 2010 = 1, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted. As a measure of financial flows we
employ the Capital Accounts and Financial Accounts: Total Balance Including Change in Reserve
Assets (US dollars, quarterly, not seasonally adjusted). The series of financial flows are only
available since 1982Q1 for Sweden, 1990Q1 for Canada and 1994Q1 for Norway. All series are
from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) database.
16Canada is the only country for which we find di↵erent patterns in the responses of the
exchange rate in high and low risk. Indeed in low risk, the currency appreciate some quarters
after the shock, whereas the response in high risk is not statistically di↵erent form zero. In our
baseline estimation we find exactly the same result.
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Figures 19-24 refer to the specification including net exports. Once again,
estimated responses are perfectly in line with our baseline results, for both output
and exchange rate. The response of output is significantly more negative when the
country is in high risk, whereas the exchange rate responds to the shock in a very
similar way in both regimes.17 Concerning the response of net exports (fig. 23-24),
as a general result we find that net exports negatively respond, which implies that
either export decreases or both import and export decrease, and the response in
low risk is larger than that in high risk, as confirmed by the di↵erences in the point
estimates for all countries but Norway.
Finally, figures 25-30 refer to the specification including financial flows. Also
in this case, the main findings coming the baseline estimation are still there.
Concerning the response of financial flows (fig. 29-30), it does not emerge a common
pattern. For Australia and Sweden financial flows positively respond to the shock,
and in the case of Australia the response in high risk is larger than that in low
risk. In the case of Germany, financial flows fall on impact and then suddenly raise
some quarters after the shock in low risk, whereas the response is not statistically
significant in high risk. For Netherlands, neither response is statistically di↵erent
from zero.18
As a general result, these exercises aiming at exploring the channels through
which a global uncertainty shock a↵ects output and exchange rates confirm the
main results coming from our baseline I-VAR estimation.
5.4 Robustness checks
Robustness of our results is tested through a series of perturbations of the baseline
specification. We consider (i) uncertainty ordered last; (ii) an uncertainty shock
dummy; (iii) the role of country-specific uncertainty; (iv) the role of financial shocks;
(v) the role played by the size of the shock. Figures 31-50 illustrate the results.
17Once again, Canada is the only country for which we find di↵erent patterns in the responses
of the exchange rate in high and low risk, as in our baseline results.
18For the part of the analysis including financial flows, results for Canada and Norway are not
displayed. Indeed, the short available series for financial flows make our results unreliable.
24
Uncertainty ordered last. Employing a recursive ordering VAR with the un-
certainty measure ordered first, as we do, is a commonly used strategy to identify
structural uncertainty shocks in the empirical literature on uncertainty (e.g., Bloom,
2009; Alexopoulos & Cohen, 2009; Mumtaz & Theodoridis, 2012).19 Using this
identification scheme implies that uncertainty shocks can immediately a↵ect ex-
change rate, prices, output and interest rate spread, whereas stock market volatility
does not immediately react to the other shocks in the model, except for the shock
to stock market levels. Since we consider a measure of global uncertainty, whereas
all other variables but stock market index are country-specific, this seems to be
a reasonable assumption, in the sense that it is plausible to assume that a global
measure does not immediately react to country-specific shocks, while the converse,
with country-specific variables immediately responding to a global shock seems
more reasonable.
Nevertheless, a shortcoming of Cholesky decomposition is that results might
depend on the particular ordering of endogenous variables. For this reason, among
robustness checks we also consider the case in which uncertainty is ordered last.
This allows to remove the possible e↵ects of other shocks from the estimated
e↵ects of the global uncertainty shock we are interested in. Figures 31-34 show the
estimated responses and the di↵erences in the point estimates for both exchange
rate and output. The results of our baseline estimation are confirmed: the negative
response of output is larger when the country is more risky, whereas the responses
of the exchange rate are very similar in the two regimes.
Uncertainty shock dummy. To identify global uncertainty shocks, as an al-
ternative to the volatility series included in baseline analysis, we build a global
uncertainty shock indicator, following Bloom (2009) and applying a narrative
approach. The indicator is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for each
of the events that we define as global uncertainty shocks, and 0 otherwise. To
select the events labeled as global uncertainty shocks, we follow Bloom and take
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) detrended (  = 129, 600) series of the 30-day realized
19To be precise, uncertainty is ordered second after the stock market index in our VAR, in
order to identify a global uncertainty (volatility) shock which is orthogonal to shocks to stock
market levels, following Bloom (2009).
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volatility of the MSCI World Index log returns, computed as the standard devi-
ations of daily returns over calendar months, and assign a value of one to the
observations that correspond to a value of stock-market volatility more than 1.65
standard deviations above the HP detrended mean. Among the events selected by
this procedure, we only keep those that we define as global shocks and exclude
those that are more country-specific in our view. Moreover, since the analysis is
carried out with quarterly data, we build a quarterly indicator in which a value of
1 is assigned to each quarter for which there is at least one month taking a value of
1 in our monthly series. The chosen global uncertainty shock events are shown in
table 2 (they are also highlighted in figure 1, where the volatility series is plotted).
Selected events are the major economic and political shocks in recent history at a
global level. Results are reported in figures 35-38. The estimates are less precise
than those obtained from our baseline specification. Nevertheless, the exchange
rate appreciates on impact in boh regimes, and the negative response of output is
larger in high risk than in low risk, in the cases of Germany and Sweden. These
findings support our baseline results.
Table 2: Global uncertainty shocks
Quarter Event
1973Q4 OPEC I, Arab-Israeli war
1982Q3 Monetary cycle turning point
1987Q4 Black Monday
1990Q3 Gulf war I
1997Q4 Asian crisis
1998Q3 Russian, LTCM default
2001Q1 Dotcom bubble
2001Q3 9/11
2002Q3 Worldcom, Enron
2003Q1 Gulf war II
2007Q3 Financial turmoils
Country-specific uncertainty. As a further robustness check, we ask whether
including a measure of country-specific uncertainty would a↵ect the responses of
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output and exchange rate to a global uncertainty shock. Indeed, it can be the case
that the e↵ects that we find are due to heightened country-specific uncertainty
rather than to a global shock. Hence, to control for idiosyncratic movements in
uncertainty, we re-estimate our model by including a measure of country-specific
uncertainty in the vector of endogenous variables. For each country in the sample,
this measure is obtained as the realized volatility of the log returns of a national
stock market index at a quarterly frequency. Results are displayed in figures 39-42.
The main findings of our analysis are confirmed.
Financial shocks vs. uncertainty shocks. There is a recent strand of literature
that focuses on financial markets frictions as a possible channel through which
uncertainty shocks can a↵ect macroeconomic variables (Arellano et al., 2012;
Gilchrist, Sim, & Zakrajsek, 2014; Alessandri & Mumtaz, 2014; Caldara, Fuentes-
Albero, Gilchrist, & Zakrajsek, 2016). Since measures of uncertainty are highly
correlated with measures of financial distress, as pointed out by Stock and Watson
(2012), it is di cult to disentangle between these two potential channels of economic
fluctuations (Caldara et al., 2016). Therefore, in order to isolate the e↵ects of
uncertainty shocks, it is important to control for financial shocks by including a
measure of financial distress in the model. To this aim, we include as an endogenous
variable in our specification the measure of credit spread recently proposed by
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) as a proxy for financial distress, the “excess bond
premium” (EBP). Figures 43-46 illustrate the dynamic responses of output and
exchange rate and the di↵erences in the point estimates and confirm our main
results.
Size of the shock. In our baseline analysis, we compute GIRFs to a one standard
deviation global uncertainty shock. In order to check whether our estimated
responses are sensitive to the size of the global uncertainty shock, we re-compute
GIRFs to shocks of a size up to five standard deviations. For the sake of illustration,
figures 47-50 show the responses to a five standard deviations global uncertainty
shock for both exchange rate and output. Our findings suggest that the size of
the shock does not play a relevant role relative to the shape and magnitude of the
impulse responses.
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6 Conclusions
What are the e↵ects of a global uncertainty shock in an open economy? Does the
level of country exposure to aggregate risk have a role in the transmission of the
shock? To answer these questions, we estimate an Interacted VAR model for a group
of countries relative to the U.S., to account for the possible presence of nonlinearities
in the transmission of the shock. Indeed, this empirical framework allows to identify
a high risk and a low risk regime and to account for time variation in country
relative riskiness, through the computation of state-conditional impulse response
functions. Global uncertainty is measured as the realized volatility of the MSCI
World Index log returns. We employ the spread between each country’s interbank
rate and the Federal Funds rate as our measure of relative risk exposure and as the
conditioning variable which separates the two regimes in the empirical analysis.
We examine the responses of output and exchange rate. Concerning the
response of output, our findings are in line with the main results in the literature
on uncertainty, in that a global uncertainty shock significantly reduces real activity.
We also find that the exchange rate responds to the shock by appreciating on impact.
Relative to the role of risk exposure in the transmission of the shock, evidence of
nonlinear e↵ects is found. Indeed, the response of economic activity to the shock is
significantly negative in high risk regime and the reduction in output is estimated
to be larger when the country is in high risk than when it is in low risk. This
result also supports the theoretical predictions of Gourio et al. (2013). For what
concerns the exchange rate, it significantly appreciates on impact in response to
the shock in both regimes, but we do not find evidence of a statistically significant
di↵erence between the responses in the two riskiness states. Some evidence pointing
to the presence of nonlinear e↵ects in the transmission of global uncertainty shocks
to the exchange rate is provided by the analysis of “extreme” riskiness regimes.
Indeed, when the distance in countries’ relative riskiness widens, the responses of
the exchange rate in the two regimes become more distant in both magnitude and
shape. The same happens to the estimated responses of output, thus reinforcing
our main findings.
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Figure 1: Plot of time series of MSCI World Index log returns realized volatility
(1973:Q1-2008:Q2).
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Figure 2: Time series of the spreads between each country’s interbank rate and
the Federal Funds rate.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of the exchange rate to a one standard deviation
shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands).
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of output to a one standard deviation shock to global
uncertainty (68% confidence bands).
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of the exchange rate to a one standard deviation
shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 6: Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse responses of the
exchange rate in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses of output to a one standard deviation shock to global
uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 8: Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse responses of output in
the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 9: State-specific responses conditional on histories of the exchange rate.
Blue: low risk; Red: high risk.
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Figure 10: State-specific responses conditional on histories of output. Blue: low
risk; Red: high risk.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses of exchange rate to a one standard deviation global
uncertainty shock and di↵erences in the point estimates. Very high risk: red line;
very low risk: blue line.
Notes: For the Netherlands, there are no initial conditions in the “very high” risk regime
subset, hence it is not possible to show the results for this part of the analysis.
37
1 4 7 10 13 16 19
-5
0
5 ×10
-3 Australia
1 4 7 10 13 16 19
-10
-5
0
5 ×10
-3 Canada
1 4 7 10 13 16 19
-10
-5
0
5 ×10
-3 Germany
1 4 7 10 13 16 19
-10
-5
0
5 ×10
-3 Norway
1 4 7 10 13 16 19
-10
-5
0
5 ×10
-3 Sweden
Low risk
High risk
High-low
Figure 12: Impulse responses of output to a one standard deviation global
uncertainty shock and di↵erences in the point estimates. Very high risk: red line;
very low risk: blue line.
Notes: For the Netherlands, there are no initial conditions in the “very high” risk regime
subset, hence it is not possible to show the results for this part of the analysis.
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Figure 13: Consumption. Impulse responses of the exchange rate to a one
standard deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low
risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 14: Consumption. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of the exchange rate in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68%
confidence bands.
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Figure 15: Consumption. Impulse responses of output to a one standard
deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low risk; red:
high risk.
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Figure 16: Consumption. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of output in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 17: Consumption. Impulse responses of consumption to a one standard
deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low risk; red:
high risk.
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Figure 18: Consumption. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of consumption in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence
bands.
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Figure 19: Net exports. Impulse responses of the exchange rate to a one
standard deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low
risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 20: Net exports. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of the exchange rate in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68%
confidence bands.
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Figure 21: Net exports. Impulse responses of output to a one standard deviation
shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 22: Net exports. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of output in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 23: Net exports. Impulse responses of net exports to a one standard
deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low risk; red:
high risk.
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Figure 24: Net exports. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of net exports in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence
bands.
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Figure 25: Financial flows. Impulse responses of the exchange rate to a one
standard deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low
risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 26: Financial flows. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of the exchange rate in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68%
confidence bands.
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Figure 27: Financial flows. Impulse responses of output to a one standard
deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low risk; red:
high risk.
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Figure 28: Financial flows. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of output in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 29: Financial flows. Impulse responses of financial flows to a one
standard deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low
risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 30: Financial flows. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of financial flows in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence
bands.
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Figure 31: Uncertainty last. Impulse responses of the exchange rate to a one
standard deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low
risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 32: Uncertainty last. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of the exchange rate in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68%
confidence bands.
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Figure 33: Uncertainty last. Impulse responses of output to a one standard
deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low risk; red:
high risk.
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Figure 34: Uncertainty last. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of output in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 35: Uncertainty dummy. Impulse responses of the exchange rate to a
one standard deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue:
low risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 36: Uncertainty dummy. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the
impulse responses of the exchange rate in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68%
confidence bands.
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Figure 37: Uncertainty dummy. Impulse responses of output to a one standard
deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low risk; red:
high risk.
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Figure 38: Uncertainty dummy. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the
impulse responses of output in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence
bands.
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Figure 39: Country-specific uncertainty. Impulse responses of the exchange
rate to a one standard deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands).
Blue: low risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 40: Country-specific uncertainty. Di↵erences in the point estimates
of the impulse responses of the exchange rate in the two states (high risk - low
risk). 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 41: Country-specific uncertainty. Impulse responses of output to a
one standard deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue:
low risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 42: Country-specific uncertainty. Di↵erences in the point estimates
of the impulse responses of output in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68%
confidence bands.
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Figure 43: EBP. Impulse responses of the exchange rate to a one standard
deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low risk; red:
high risk.
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Figure 44: EBP. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse responses of
the exchange rate in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 45: EBP. Impulse responses of output to a one standard deviation shock
to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 46: EBP. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse responses of
output in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 47: Size of the shock. Impulse responses of the exchange rate to a one
standard deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low
risk; red: high risk.
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Figure 48: Size of the shock. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of the exchange rate in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68%
confidence bands.
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Figure 49: Size of the shock. Impulse responses of output to a one standard
deviation shock to global uncertainty (68% confidence bands). Blue: low risk; red:
high risk.
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Figure 50: Size of the shock. Di↵erences in the point estimates of the impulse
responses of output in the two states (high risk - low risk). 68% confidence bands.
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Appendix
Computation of GIRFs
To compute state-conditional Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs)
we follow the algorithm proposed in Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino (2015),
which in turn follows the steps in Koop et al. (1996) and simulates the e↵ects of an
orthogonal structural shock as in Kilian and Vigfusson (2011).
The idea is to compute the empirical counterpart of the theoreticalGIRFy(h,  ,!t 1)
of the vector of endogenous variables yt, h periods ahead, for a given initial con-
dition !t 1 = {yt 1, . . . ,yt k}, k being the number of lags in the I-VAR, and a
structural shock hitting at time t  . Following Koop et al. (1996), we express such
GIRF as follows:
GIRFy(h,  ,!t 1) = E[yt+h |  ,!t 1]  E[yt+h |!t 1]
where E[·] is the expectation operator and h = 0, 1, . . . , H indicates the horizons
for which the GIRF is computed.
The procedure to compute it is the following:
1. Pick an initial condition !t 1.
2. Conditional on !t 1 and the I-VAR structure of the model, simulate the path
[yt+h|!t 1]r, by loading the VAR with a sequence of randomly extracted (with
repetition) residuals u˜rt+h ⇠ d(0, ⌃ˆ), where d is the empirical distribution of
the residuals, ⌃ˆ is the estimated variance-covariance matrix and r indicates
the particular sequence of residual extracted.
3. Conditional on !t 1 and the structure of the model, simulate the path
[yt+h| ,!t 1]r, by loading the VAR with a perturbation of the randomly ex-
tracted residuals u˜rt+h ⇠ d(0, ⌃ˆ) obtained in Step 2.
To obtain perturbed residuals, first recover the vector of orthogonalized
shocks ✏˜rt . Take the Cholesky decomposition of ⌃ˆ = CˆCˆ
0, where Cˆ is a lower
triangular matrix. The orthogonalized shocks are given by ✏˜rt = Cˆ
 1u˜rt+h.
Then, to obtain a series of perturbed orthogonalized shocks, add a quantity
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  > 0 to the element ✏˜runc,t, which is the scalar stochastic element loading the
uncertainty equation in the VAR. Finally, to move from perturbed orthogo-
nalized shocks to perturbed residuals that we use to simulate [yt+h| ,!t 1]r,
compute them as u˜rt = Cˆ ✏˜
r
t+h.
4. At each horizon, compute the di↵erence between the simulated paths [yt+h| ,!t 1]r 
[yt+h|!t 1]r.
5. For each initial condition !t 1, repeat Steps 2-4 for R = 500 times. Then,
store the average realization across repetitions for each horizon h. In this way,
a consistent estimate of the GIRF for any given initial condition is obtained:
\GIRF y(h,  ,!t 1) = Eˆ[yt+h |  ,!t 1]  Eˆ[yt+h |!t 1].
6. To produce the point estimates of state-conditional GIRFs, average history-
dependent GIRFs over a particular subset of initial conditions of inter-
est. In our case, an initial history !t 1 belongs to “high risk” regime if
SPREADi,t 1 < 0 and to “low risk” regime if SPREADi,t 1   0.
7. Confidence bands are computed via a bootstrap procedure. To implement it,
simulate S = 1000 samples of the same size as actual data. Then, for each
simulated dataset estimate the I-VAR model and repeat Steps 1-6 to compute
state-dependent GIRFs. Confidence bands are given by the 16th and the
84th percentiles of the resulting distribution of state-conditional GIRFs.
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